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A. Introduction 
In this master´s thesis, I will set out to analyse the nuclear deal that an international coalition 
of actors struck with Iran in 2015 and assess, in particular, the role of the European Union 
(EU) therein. Consequently, a first object of my analysis will be the nuclear deal itself. In 
greater detail, I will thus look at the basis of it, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA). Attention will be paid to both material and procedural elements of the JCPOA. 
Additional focus will lie on the JCPOA´s relationship with international law in order to fully 
appreciate the nature of the nuclear deal with Iran. In a second step, the role of the European 
Union in the framework of the JCPOA will be examined. This includes a reference to the 
legal basis for EU action as well as a specific survey of those JCPOA provisions that concern 
the European Union. In light of the current US administration´s disengagement with the 
nuclear deal at the time of the writing of this thesis, a dedicated section seeks to depict the 
legal aspects of the EU´s effort to save the nuclear deal. Referencing an assessment of the 
JCPOA of both academic observers and political actors, this thesis will be concluded with a 
comprehensive summary of the findings.   
I. Background: The Foreign Policy Interests of the European Union 
Reference to the foreign policy interests of the European Union can be found in the Treaties. 
While Article 3.1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the Union´s aims, including 
the promotion of peace and its values, Article 3.5 TEU specifies that the Union in its relations 
with the wider world shall, inter alia, „uphold and promote its values and interests...contribute 
to peace, security...as well as to the strict observance of international law”.1 This is further 
elaborated in Article 21 TEU. According to the precepts of Article 21 TEU, „the Union 
shall...pursue common policies and actions...in order to...preserve peace, prevent conflict 
and strengthen international security...and promote an international system based on 
stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance”.2 These themes are, 
accordingly, echoed in the latest European Union foreign policy strategy. The interests of the 
EU are spelled out in there in plain: „peace and security”, „prosperity”, „rules-based global 
order”, „multilateralism as key principle and United Nations as its core”, „manage 
interdependence” and „address root causes of conflict and poverty and promote human 
rights”.3 
Therefore and before the backdrop of the evolution of EU foreign policy interests, it is not 
surprising that the EU has a long-standing interest in contributing to international efforts in 
the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including, most 
                                               
1
 TEU, Article 3.1, 3.5 
2
 TEU, Article 21.2; note that Article 205 TFEU also refers to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title V TEU 
3
 The quoted priorities already represent a selection, see, EEAS, 2016, p. 7,8 
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importantly, nuclear weapons.4 Non-proliferation of WMD has been on the international 
agenda for a long time. As early as 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) came into effect, building on three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.5 Beyond the NPT, several other 
international legal instruments add to the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
system.6 Although opinions amongst EU Member States on nuclear disarmament diverge 
considerably, the issue of non-proliferation as such is largely uncontroversial within the EU.7 
The European Union has, reflecting large consensus amongst its Member States and in line 
with its most fundamental foreign policy interests as set out in the Treaties, identified the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, as a key 
threat to European security. This has consequently led to the adoption of a dedicated EU 
strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.8 This strategy was 
endorsed by the Council in 2003. The strategy states unambiguously: „WMD and missile 
proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the 
world. Meeting this challenges must be a central element in the EU´s external action”.9 With 
a view to responding to this challenge, the strategy sets out: „Our approach will be guided by 
our conviction that a multilaterlist approach to security...provides the best way to maintain 
international order...our commitment to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation agreements 
and treaties...our determination to support the multilateral institutions charged respectively 
with the verification and upholding of compliance with these treaties”.10 With a view to tools 
and instruments, the strategy refers, inter alia, to the use of multilateral treaties, political 
dialogue and diplomatic pressure, including with the support of partners, national and 
internationally coordinated export controls, political and economic levers (including trade and 
development policy), but does not fail to mention that the Security Council may also have 
recourse to coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.11 The strategy identifies 
a number of action points that may be carried out in furtherance of the envisioned 
objectives.12 The theme of supporting international initiatives aimed at the promotion of EU 
                                               
4
 Compare with provisions on interests of EU in, e.g., the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, see, Vertrag 
über die Europäische Union, 1992 and Vertrag von Amsterdam, 1997 
5
 European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016; for a concise summary of the main provisions of the NPT, 
see, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p. 5,6 
6
 For a more detailed account, see, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p. 6,7,8 
7
 Two EU Member States (UK and France) are nuclear weapons states, others host US nuclear weapons on their 
territory while others are very strong disarmament advocates (e.g. Sweden and Finland), see, European 
Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p. 29; Meier, 2014, p. 6 
8
 European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p. 29 
9
 ibid.  
10
 Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 5 
11
 ibid.; Council of the European Union, 2003 p. 8 
12
 Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 9-13 
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goals (e.g. „verification regimes”; „export control regimes”) is fully reflected as is the intent to 
support other states in their efforts to ensure non-proliferation.13  
It is before the backdrop of the EU´s foreign policy interests, in particular its long-standing 
commitment to non-proliferation of WMD, including, most importantly, nuclear weapons, and 
its consequent espousal of a dedicated WMD strategy that European efforts to engage with 
Iran on its nuclear programme have to be understood.14 
II. Negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)  
The Iranian nuclear programme had for a long time been the subject of heated international 
debate.15 Iran began developing nuclear technology in the 1970s when the US Atoms for 
Peace programme provided support to the Iranian government under the Shah.16 After initial 
suspension following the revolution 1979, the new Islamic regime continued to pursue the 
programme in 1980s, but always declared that it would serve civilian purposes only.17 It was, 
however, widely believed that this might well be a cover for a clandestine attempt at 
developing nuclear weapons.18 These suspicions were corroborated in 2002 when 
intelligence brought to light that Iran was covertly constructing the Natanz enrichment facility 
and the Arak heavy-water reactor, which could be used to produce weapons-grade 
plutonium.19 This was in breach of Iran´s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to which Iran acceded as a non-nuclear weapon 
state. Additionally, there were reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
that made public in 2003 that Iran violated the terms of the NPT.20 This led to first diplomatic 
negotiations between France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Iran that culminated in the 
Teheran Declaration and later the Paris Declarations in 2003 and 2004. In these 
declarations, Iran professed to abandon temporarily activities that aim at both enrichment 
and conversion.  
This was meant to extend also to both manufacture and operation of centrifuges. The two 
declarations have, however, proven unsuccessful in curtailing the Iranian nuclear 
programme.21 After the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2005, the new Iranian 
leader called the deal off and informed the IAEA that Iran would restart conversion and 
                                               
13
 ibid.; for an interesting comment and leads to further literature on international efforts in the area of non-
proliferation, see, Martellini and Zucchetti, 2016 
14
 Compare how the language of the Council conclusions adopting the JCPOA makes reference to the EU´s 
interests, see, Council of the European Union, 2015 
15
 Sterio, 2016, p.  70-74 
16
 Sterio, 2016, p. 70; Joyner, 2016, Chapter 1 
17
 Meier-Walser, 2017, p. 183 
18
 Sterio, 2016, p. 71 
19
 Meier-Walser, 2017, p. 182 
20
 Sterio, 2016, p. 71; Perthes has convincingly argued that if Iran had the „bomb”, this would also mean a huge 
blow to the NPT, see, Perthes, 2008, p. 11 
21
 For a summary of past negotiations with Iran about its nuclear programme and their respective outcome, see, 
Haupt, 2016, p. 408 
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enrichment at several locations.22 In response, the IAEA had to refer the matter to the UN 
Security Council which then adopted six different resolutions in view of Iran´s nuclear 
programme, demanding from Iran to cease its enrichment activities. The UN Security Council 
also imposed sanctions on Iran, including asset freezing of Iranian individuals and 
companies.23 The situation grew even more tense when US intelligence services revealed in 
2009 that Iran had significantly expanded its nuclear programme.24 It was only with the 
election of Hassan Rouhani in August 2013 to the post of Iranian President that the situation 
was gripped by a novel dynamic. Rouhani indicated a readiness on part of the Iranians to 
resume serious talks about the Iranian nuclear programme.25 It did not take long before Iran 
was able to sign an interim agreement with the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, 
China and Germany. Under the so called „Joint Plan of Action” Iran accepted the temporary 
suspension of its nuclear programme while the other powers agreed to decreased economic 
sanctions. This interim agreement was set to last six months, giving negotiators the time to 
reach a long-term agreement.26 Formal implementation of the interim agreement was 
undertaken on January 20, 2014. This date kicked off the process that led to the negotiation 
and the subsequent conclusion of the JCPOA.  
III. Negotiating Parties: The E3/EU+3 and Iran  
European concern for the Iranian nuclear programme had been long-standing. In 2003, after 
an alarming report of the IAEA Board of Governors on Iran´s nuclear programme that 
criticized in particular Iran´s lack of cooperation with the IAEA, some EU Member States 
decided for themselves to join international efforts to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons.27 It was namely France, Germany and United Kingdom who initiated, as already 
pointed out, first joint political action. Consequently, they founded a diplomatic group, which 
was referred to as the EU-3 or E3 to reach out to Iran in the framework of joint discussions.28 
The purpose of this initiative was to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and limit 
its nuclear programme.29 Alcaro has pointed out that the E3 (United Kingdom, France, 
Germany) acted as a lead group – and won support for their initiative from other EU Member 
States by including the EU High Representative.30  Javier Solana, who then served as EU 
High Representative, became hence actively involved and supported missions and 
                                               
22
 Sterio, 2016, p. 72 
23
 Sterio, 2016, p. 72 
24
 Sterio, 2016, p. 72 
25
 Meier-Walser, 2017, p. 184 
26
 For details of the Joint Plan of Action, see, Meier-Walser, 2017, p. 186 
27
 Osiewicz, 2018, p. 155 
28
 Osiewicz, 2018, p. 155 
29
 Osiewicz, 2018, p. 155 
30
 Alcaro, 2018; Rafati suggested that the EU was included in the negotiations process to assuage concern in 
other capitals regarding the E3 remit as it made the carrots on offer for Iran much more significant as with the 
involvement of the EU the scope became continental instead of only national, see, Rafati, 2017, p. 2 
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negotiations with Iran early on while at the same time preparing the ground for the EU´s role 
in these negotiations.31 In the years 2003-2005, the EU was the lead actor in the negotiations 
with Iran.32 Then powers in the Security Council assumed a stronger role.33 It was in 2006 
when China, Russia and the United States came to join the E3. The format became 
E3/EU+3.34 The inclusion of Russia and China as well as the United States ensured that any 
mutually agreeable solution would very likely find the blessing of the UN Security Council as 
all UN Security Council members that carry veto powers were directly implicated.35 The 
United States, for their part, have long regarded the prevention of Iran´s obtaining of an 
atomic bomb a critical security objective.36 The Obama Administration did, in that, not set 
itself significantly apart from previous US-administrations as it clearly reaffirmed its 
commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons prior to the commencement of 
real negotiations.37  
After the irksome and unsettling years of Ahmadinejad´s reign in Iran when a climate of 
confrontation predominated the relations and effectively thwarted all attempts at real 
progress with regards to Western concerns over Iran´s nuclear programm, Iran, under its 
new President Hassan Rouhani, decided to become a serious negotiation party.38 Iran´s 
newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, wrote an article in which he clearly 
stated Iran´s interest in improving relations with the West: „Iran will also engage with 
European countries and other Western states with the goal of reinvigorating and further 
expanding relations. This normalization process must be based on the principles of mutual 
respect and mutual interest, and it must address issues of legitimate concern to both 
sides”.39 
On this basis, negotiations on the contents of the JCPOA were commenced. These 
negotiations, that stretched from early 2014 until July 14, 2015, culminated in the agreement 
on the initial deal framework in Lausanne and eventually in a 17 days-long negotiation in 
Vienna in late June and July 2015. On July 14, 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran were able to 
announce that they had reached a groundbreaking agreement, the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action.  
 
 
                                               
31
 Thränert, 2005 
32
 ibid 
33
 ibid 
34
 Osiewicz, 2018, p. 155 
35
 Rafati, 2017, p. 2 
36
 Gärtner and Akbulut, 2017, p. 171 
37
 Gärtner and Akbulut, 2017, p. 173 
38
 Yet even under Ahmadinejad, negotiations of Iran with the EU3/EU+3 took place, see: Meier-Walser, 2017 
39
 Zarif, 2014, p. 10 
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B. The Nuclear Deal with Iran (JCPOA) 
I. Main Elements of the Nuclear Deal 
The basis of the nuclear deal with Iran takes the form of a document that counts 18 pages 
that are divided up into three consecutive parts (A, B, C) that are each further subdivided. 
Preceding this structure is both a preface and a preamble that contains general provisions. 
To this document, an Annex is attached that comprises another five documents that further 
specify provisions of the agreement. All this forms part of the agreement that is entitled „Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA). The role of the Annex is clarified in the preceding 
document. Reference is accordingly made to „technical details of the implementation of this 
JCPOA” that are dealt with in the five Annexes to the document.40  
 
a. Material Elements 
aa. Mutual Commitments 
Mutual commitments are laid down in the core document and further specified in the annexes 
thereto. It is noted that the commitments in the JCPOA are „reciprocal”.41 Both sides promise 
to commit to the JCPOA in „good faith” and in a „constructive atmosphere”, „based on mutual 
respect”.42 All JCPOA participants agree furthermore  „not to engage in any action 
inconsistent with letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA”.43 Materially, it is of foremost 
importance to note that Iran, by entering into the JCPAO, commits to an exclusively peaceful 
nuclear programme and pledges never to seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.44 
While this is already explicitly stated in the preamble, it is also reaffirmed on other occasions 
in the document.45 The document is designed around this very fundamental centerpiece of 
the agreement. Iran’s subsequent commitments, as they are detailed in the course of the 
document, are flowing from this very crucial first key commitment. Further to this, Iran 
commits to respect limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related 
activities. This extends also to the acceptance of limits to specific research and development 
activities.46 All of Iran´s nuclear-related commitments are further specified in Annex I.47 The 
main duties that Iran accepted in the context of the JCPOA include the reduction of 
operational centrifuges, the establishment of a civilian Research and Development center by 
reconverting the enrichment facility at Fordow, the redevelopment of the Arak heavy water 
                                               
40
 JCPOA, xii. p. 4 
41
 JCPOA, i, p. 3 
42
 JCPOA, viii. p. 3 
43
 JCPOA, ii. and iii., p. 3 
44
 JCPOA, ii and iii, p. 3 
45
 E.g. JCPOA, paragraph 16, p. 9  
46
 JCPOA, paragraph 1-7, p. 6,7 
47
 JCPOA, Annex I; for a concise summary of technical nuclear-related commitments of Iran, see, Martellini and 
Zuchetti, 2016, p. 479,480,481 
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reactor in order to prevent the production of weapon-grade plutonium, a commitment not to 
construct a reprocessing facility, the evacuation out of Iran of nearly all its enriched uranium 
stocks, and the acceptance of enhanced levels of IAEA-monitoring.48 Some of the obligations 
carry a time limit.49 It is noteworthy in this regard that Iran also accepted a certain range of 
associated obligations that are clustered under the heading „Transparency and Confidence 
Building Measures”. Consequently, Iran accepted to provisionally apply the Additional 
Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.50 Further to this, Iran committed to 
fully act on the Roadmap for clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues that has 
been agreed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).51 Iran also committed to 
allow the IAEA access to monitor and verify compliance both with its commitments under the 
JCPOA and with the voluntary measures Iran committed to under paragraph 15 of the 
JCPOA.52 Additionally, Iran pledged full cooperation and to act in line with the procurement 
channel as detailed in Annex IV.53 All JCPOA participants undertook a mutual commitment to 
dispute resolution in line with a dispute resolution mechanism provided for in this JCPOA if 
necessary.54  
A further commitment, that all participants undertake vis-à-vis each other, is to proceed with 
the implementation of their respective commitment in accordance with a so-called 
„implementation plan”.55 Mention is made of a „Joint Commission” that shall oversee the 
implementation of the JCPOA.56 Meetings at ministerial level are foreseen at least every two 
years in order to take stock of the progress.57 All JCPOA participants acknowledge that the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the heart of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as 
they do reaffirm their commitment to the UN Charter.58 Participants in the JCPOA pledge to 
cooperate in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy where this is deemed appropriate. 
More specifically, the participants agree to explore the possibility for civil nuclear cooperation 
projects.59  
Furthermore, the EU and the US enter into clearly specified commitments to terminate 
specific sanctions that were in place in respect of Iran´s nuclear programme. It is explicitly 
                                               
48
 JCPOA, Annex I; Martellini and Zuchetti, 2016, p. 479,480 
49
 E.g. provisions with regards to spent fuel reprocessing activities, see, JCPOA, Annex I, paragraph 18,19, p. 7; 
paragraph 24,25,26, p. 8; or provisions with regards to enrichment capacity, see, JCPOA, Annex I, paragraph 31, 
p. 9; or provisions with regards to centrifuges research and development, see, JCPOA, Annex I, paragraph 36,39, 
p. 10; paragraph 40, p. 11; or provisions with regards to the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, see, JCPOA, Annex I, 
paragraph 45,46, p. 12; paragraph 50, p. 13 
50
 JCPOA, paragraph 13, p. 8 
51
 JCPOA, paragraph 14, p. 8 
52
 PCPOA, x, p. 4; JCPOA, paragraph 15, p. 9 
53
 JCPOA, paragraph 17, p. 9 
54
 JCPOA, paragraph 36, p. 17 
55
 JCPOA, paragraph 34, p. 16 
56
 JCPOA, ix, p. 4 
57
 JCPOA, xvi, p. 5 
58
 JCPOA, vii, vi, p. 3 
59
 JCPOA, xiii, p. 4 
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stated that the E3+3 commit to refraining from the introduction of discriminatory regulatory 
and procedural requirements that would contravene the express commitment to end all 
nuclear-programme related sanctions on Iran.60 Additionally, the participants in the JCPOA 
pledge also to lift all UN Security Council sanctions related to Iran´s nuclear programme.61 To 
facilitate this, the E3+3 promise to table a draft resolution in the Security Council, which 
endorses the JCPOA and decides to end on implementation day all UN sanctions directed at 
Iran in relation to its nuclear programme.62 This was to lead in effect to a situation in which 
Iran can fully exercise its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in line with the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The E3+3 states accordingly commit to treat Iran like 
any other state party to the NPT.63 Other commitments of the EU and the E3+3 countries 
include, notably, a pledge to cooperate with Iran in field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
as is detailed further in Annex III.64  
 
bb. Sanctions 
The JCPOA participants commit themselves upon adoption of the JCPOA to terminate a 
range of specific sanctions that were previously instituted notably by the UN Security 
Council, the US and the EU with a reference to the Iranian nuclear programme. Accordingly, 
the JCPOA dedicates a section to „sanctions“. In this section, there are provisions in respect 
of which sanctions are to be lifted65, the timeframe66, safeguards for the reintroduction of 
sanctions67, a political commitment on part of the E3+3 to consistent and good faith 
execution of the agreement68, a commitment not to undermine the effects of this sanctions-
lifting69, specific provisions on sanctions targeted at individuals or companies70, and a pledge 
of the E3+3 to facilitate Iran´s peaceful use of nuclear technology by means of technical 
cooperation projects.71 A complete list of all sanctions that are to be terminated are attached 
to the JCPOA in Annex II.72 The three-phased lifting of sanctions is set out in Annex V.73 In 
the JCPOA, reference is made to a series of UN Security Council resolutions that are related 
to Iranian nuclear programme and whose provisions are to be terminated by a new UN 
Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA.  
                                               
60
 JCPOA, viii, p. 3 
61
 JCPOA, v, p. 3 
62
 JCPOA, xiv, p. 4 
63
 JCPOA, iv, p. 3 
64
 JCPOA, xiii, p. 4 
65
 JCPOA, paragraph 20,21,22,23,24,31, p. 10,11,14,15 
66
 JCPOA, paragraph 18,19,20,21,22,23,24,31, p. 10,11,13,14,15; see also, Haupt, 2016, p. 443,444; JCPOA, 
Annex V 
67
 JCPOA, paragraph 24,25,26,27,28,29, p. 13,14 
68
 JCPOA, paragraph 28, p. 14 
69
 JCPOA, paragraph 29, p. 14 
70
 JCPOA, paragraph 31, p. 14,15 
71
 JCPOA, paragraph 32, 33, p. 15 
72
 See, JCPOA, Annex II, p. 1 - 15 
73
 JCPOA, Annex V 
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Another heading concerns those sanctions that were previously put in place in pursuit of the 
pertinent EU regulation. Heading 19 enumerates a list of areas that were subject to EU 
sanctions prior to the JCPOA, and that are to be terminated as a consequence of the 
JCPOA. The character of these sanctions is „economic and financial” as the JCPOA affirms. 
Another set of EU sanctions that relate to proliferation are to be ended eight years after 
Adoption Day or when the IAEA has attested that all nuclear material in Iran serves peaceful 
purposes, whichever is earlier.74 With reference to the US, it is noteworthy that the US 
pledges to cease the application of sanctions that are specified in Annex II.  
The JCPOA furthermore provides in Article 24 that Annex II constitutes a complete list of all 
nuclear-related sanctions and restrictive measures that are to be lifted in accordance with the 
implementation plan in Annex V. This Annex is divided up into two parts, one (Part A) that 
lists all sanctions that were imposed by the European Union, and another one (Part B) that 
lists all the sanctions that were put in place by the United States. Part A is further subdivided 
into three parts, one part that lists all sectors of the Iranian economy that were targeted with 
EU sanctions, naming all the sanctions and respective legal bases in EU law75, another that 
counts only one paragraph that stipulates that all those listed sanctions amount to a full list of 
all EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures aimed at Iran76, and a third on EU 
economic and financial sanctions and their effect.77 Part B of Annex II follows a similar 
subdivision. There are four parts to Part B, one detailing all sanctions whose application the 
US commits to cease 78, another on „other trade measures” the US commits to79, a third part 
stipulating that the preceding list equals all US nuclear-related sanctions in place against 
Iran80, and a fourth part on the lifting of US economic and financial sanctions and its effect.81   
 
cc. International Procurement Channel 
Reference to the procurement channel is made in the JCPOA whereby the respective 
paragraph points to Annex IV for further elaboration.82 The paragraph also contains a 
commitment on the part of Iran to act in accordance with aforementioned procurement 
channel. It is, thus, an obligation Iran enters into. Annex V in accordance with the reference 
made in the JCPOA sets out to specify the notion of a procurement channel, its purpose and 
functioning.83 The procurement channel will be administered by the Procurement Working 
Group, a sub-group of the Joint Commission, that has the powers „to review and to decide on 
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proposals by states seeking to engage in, for instance, the supply, sale or transfer…of all 
items, materials, equipment, goods and technology...if the end use will be for Iran´s nuclear 
programme”.84 The same applies to technical assistance or training or even Iran´s ability to 
take part in another state´s activity involving Uranium mining.85  
The Annex lays down the composition and the functioning of this working group as well as 
the process for consideration of proposals and related decision-making.86 These rules 
include a provision on the maximum duration for the consideration and subsequent decision 
on a proposal, a provision on the requirement of „necessary supporting information”, and a 
provision on the adoption of a proposal.87 It attracts attention that, procedurally, consensus is 
required for a proposal to be approved. Consensus is reached when there is no explicit 
disapproval. If the Working Group fails to achieve consensus the proposal can be referred to 
the Joint Commission for a consensus decision.88 The Working Group itself shall meet every 
three weeks and shall have the EU´s High Representative as coordinator.89 The 
Procurement Working Group will submit a record of its decisions via the Joint Commission to 
the UN Security Council at least every 6 months.90  
 
dd. Snap-Back Mechanism 
The so-called snap-back mechanism is introduced as an element of the dispute resolution 
paragraph of the JCPOA.91 As it is introduced in the JCPOA, „snap-back” means that UN 
sanctions against Iran, which were meant to be lifted as a commitment on part of the JCPOA 
participants, could be easily reinstated in their entirety in case dispute resolution fails. For 
this to happen, the UN Security Council has a special role. After notification from the 
complaining participant that dispute resolution in line with the pertinent provisions of the 
JCPOA has failed, the Security Council has to vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions-
lifting.92 If that resolution is not adopted within 30 days after notification, all the previous 
sanctions contained in the respective UN Security Council resolutions would be reinstated 
unless the Security Council makes a different decision.93 As standard procedural rules of the 
UN Security Council apply to such a decision, any participant in the JCPOA, who holds a 
permanent seat in the Security Council and who does have veto power, would be technically 
able to thwart a Security Council resolution which is required to maintain the abrogation of 
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the sanctions.94 This amounts to a reverse veto.  Commentators have tended to view this 
clause as a safeguard and a deterrent, reflecting „mistrust”.95  
It has to be noted that „snap-back” refers to UN Security Council-mandated sanctions only, 
the specific US sanctions regime as well as independent EU sanctions would be exempt 
from this mechanism. Neither in the JCPOA nor in UNSCR 2231 mention is made of 
reimposing US or EU nuclear-related sanctions upon activitation of „snap-back”.96 A second 
limitation of the snap-back mechanism is that the mechanism does not have retroactive 
effect. Accordingly, contracts concluded by third parties in Iran after January 16, 2016 until 
the day of possible reimposition of UN sanctions would be exempted from the effect of 
reintroduced sanctions.97 Note that Iran has stated that it would treat the reimposition of 
sanctions as a reason to renege on its commitments under the JCPOA.98 
 
b. Procedural Elements 
aa. Timetable 
The JCPOA was agreed and concluded on July 14, 2015 in Vienna („Finalization Day”).99 On 
July 25, 2015 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 regarding the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action.100 This resolution endorses the JCPOA and specifies a 
schedule to end restrictive measures against Iran.101 Following the review of the JCPOA in 
the EU and the US, „Adoption Day” was proclaimed on October 18, 2015 which initiated in 
accordance with the so called „implementation plan” the implementation of the provisions of 
the JCPOA. „Implementation Day” was reached on January 16, 2016 after the International 
Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran fully honoured its commitments under the JCPOA. 
Next steps include „Transition Day” and 10 years after Adoption Day the „Termination Day” 
would be reached.102 The timetable for sanctions-lifting is three-phased in accordance with 
the implementation plan.103 
 
bb. Implementation Plan 
The implementation plan is dealt with both in the JCPOA, paragraphs 34 and 35, and by 
extension in greater detail in Annex V. Paragraph 34 makes reference to a specific series of 
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milestones that are to be achieved as implementation of the JCPOA progresses.104 Those 
milestones include, as has already been touched upon, „Finalisation Day”, „Adoption Day”, 
„Implementation Day”, „Transition Day”, and „Termination Day”.105 Each of these milestones 
carries along with it specific actions that EU, US, and Iran commit to undertake at a given 
point in time, which is stipulated in the pertinent paragraph. Reference to these actions is 
made in the JCPOA, a concrete list of these actions is given in Annex V. In line with the 
proposed sequence, „Adoption Day”, for example, will see the preparation of an EU 
Regulation, taking effect on Implementation Day, that ends specific provisions of the earlier 
EU Regulation in which nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions against Iran are 
contained. The US, in accordance with its commitment made under the paragraphs of the 
JCPOA relating to sanctions, will cease the application of its nuclear-related sanctions in 
place against Iran.106 It is important to note that the same time-delayed effect applies, so that 
US nuclear-related sanctions will cease to apply as of Implementation Day. A detailed 
description of actions is attached to the other milestones.107 Additionally, „Termination Day” 
will bring about a new UN Security Council Resolution in accordance with the terms of the 
Security Council Resolution endorsing the JCPOA.108 On Termination Day and with this new 
UN Security Council Resolution, the UN Security Council would no longer be concerned with 
the Iran nuclear issue.109  
 
cc. Joint Commission 
A „Joint Commission”, consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, is established on the basis of the 
JCPOA.110 A provision to this effect is included in the Preamble. While the paragraph 
provides for the establishment of the Joint Commission, it does set out broad notions of its 
functioning („will carry out functions provided for in this JCPOA”) and clarifies its raison d´être 
(„address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA”).111 The Annex IV on the 
Joint Commission then further specifies in seven paragraphs nature, functioning and 
decision-making of the Joint Commission.112  
The EU High Representative shall act as coordinator of the Joint Commission.113 It may also 
establish dedicated Working Groups.114 It is noteworthy in that regard that on the basis of 
Annex IV the Joint Commission allows for the establishment of the „Procurement Working 
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Group”, that shall be a Joint Commission configuration responsible for discharging its 
functions in accordance with its role in the procurement channel as stipulated in relevant 
paragraphs of the JCPOA.115 A similar Joint Commission configuration, established by 
means of Annex IV, is the „Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting”, which is 
another offshot of the Joint Commission assembling participants from the the Joint 
Commission under the coordinatorship of the EU High Representative.116 The central 
functions of the Joint Commission relate to the close monitoring and to the review of issues 
pertaining to Iran´s civilian nuclear programme.117  
An example include a Joint Commission responsibility to assess the final design for the 
modernised heavy water research reactor and the design of the subsidiary laboratories.118 
The Joint Commission shall meet at least quarterly and at any time upon the request of an 
JCPOA participant, decisions shall be made by consenus except as stated otherwise in 
Annex IV.119 Consensus shall guide decisions under the procurement channel in the 
Procurement Working Group. As pointed out in the paragraph on the procurement channel of 
this thesis, consensus in the Procurement Working Group will be reached when there is no 
explicit disapproval.120 The Working Group on Implementation of Sanctions Lifting provides a 
forum to discuss all matters related to the implementation of sanctions-lifting. If the Working 
Group is unable to resolve any issue relating to the implementation of sanctions-lifting that 
may be put on the agenda at any time at the request of an individual Working Group 
participant, then the issue will be passed onto the Joint Commission for consideration.121 This 
is illustrative of the fact that the Joint Commission may be viewed as the highest 
institutionalised political forum within the framework of the JCPOA to resolve questions and 
issues arising from the implementation of the JCPOA.122 The Joint Commission consequently 
also has a role in dispute resolution under the JCPOA. 
 
dd. Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Dispute resolution is provided for in the JCPOA and the terms are laid down in two 
paragraphs at the very end of the JCPOA main text body.123 In essence, all parties to the 
JCPOA have been given the right to turn to the Joint Commission if any participant holds the 
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view that another participant is not respecting its commitments under the JCPOA.124 The 
Joint Commission would then have 15 days to resolve the issue unless a consensus decision 
provides for an extension. After the Joint Commission has considered the issue, it could then 
be transferred to the consideration of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Dispute resolution also 
provides for the ad-hoc appointment of an Advisory Board, which includes three members 
(one each appointed by participants to the dispute and one independent member). If set up, 
the Advisory Board would have 15 days to issue a non-binding opinion for the attention of the 
Joint Commission on the dispute in question, which would have another five days to resolve 
the issue. After this time has elapsed and the complaining JCPOA participant still believes 
that the issue has not been resolved satisfactorily, then the participant could treat this as a 
ground to cease its own obligations under the JCPOA and inform the UN Security Council, 
making a case that the unresolved issue constitutes significant non-performance on part of 
another participant.125 Once it has become seized of the matter, the Security Council votes, 
in accordance with its procedures, on a resolution to continue the sanctions-lifting. If the 
respective resolution is not adopted within 30 days, then the „snap-back mechanism” will be 
enabled and all the provisions of former UN Security Council resolutions that imposed 
sanctions on Iran would be reinstated, unless the UN Security Council comes to a different 
decision.126   
 
II. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and International 
Law 
a. The Legal Status of the JCPOA 
Treaties are an important source of international law. States enter into binding commitments 
and regulate by consent matters of common concern. Treaties can thus be considered an 
instrument that brings „stability, reliability and order in international relations”.127 The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a treaty as an „international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation“.128  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties notes furthermore that „every state 
possesses capacity to conclude treaties“.129 A defining characteristic of a treaty is the fact 
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that states have expressly consented to be bound by a treaty. Article 11 VCLT accordingly 
reads: „The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, 
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 
or by any other means if so agreed“.130 It is important to note that states often also have 
domestic rules in place on what constitutes a treaty.131  
Treaties as defined in the VCLT must be considered as distinct from so called political 
commitments or political accords. The concept of a political accord or commitment has been 
defined by Hollis and Newcomer as  „a non-legally binding agreement between two or more 
nation-states in which the parties intend to establish commitments of an exclusively political 
or moral nature“.132 The „manifest intent“ to undertake a political commitment as opposed to 
consent to be legally bound by a treaty is a defining difference that puts a state´s sovereignty 
at the center.133 While they do most notably base their argument on established state 
practice, it is worth noting that the drafters of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
also understood their definition of treaties to exclude political commitments.134 In short, states 
agree to a treaty if they have the intention of doing so; likewise, states agree to a political 
commitment if this is what they intend to do.135 This intent can be demonstrated by plainly 
stating it in the respective document or by deliberatey disclaiming any intention to create a 
legally binding instrument,  including in terms of language use.136  
At the heart of the distinction between treaties and political commitment is thus the question 
of legal effect. In the words of Hollis and Newcomer: „International law governs the treaty 
such that its breach can generate both political and legal consequences; in contrast, only 
politics governs the political commitment so its breach will only produce political 
consequences“.   
Haupt has argued that JCPOA does not constitute an international treaty.137 According to 
him, the language of the JCPOA reflects its drafters´ intention not to create an international 
agreement, most notably the fact that all commitments made in JCPOA have been qualified 
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as „voluntary commitments” would count as evidence to that effect.138 Similarly, JCPOA 
participants have carefully avoided all treaty terminology.  
They do refer to themselves as „JCPOA participants” rather than „parties” to the JCPOA, 
mindful that a „party” is defined in Article 2 (1) (g) of the Vienna Covention on the Law of 
Treaties as „a state that has consented to be bound by a treaty and for which the treaty has 
entered into force”.139 Talmon has observed that the signatures on the JCPOA must not be 
confused with treaty signatures. The difference is shown by the fact that a treaty is signed at 
the end of the document, while the JCPOA was signed by the negotiators on its cover page. 
Rather than constituting signatures legally binding State parties, the signatures of the 
negotiators of the JCPOA symbolized the political endorsement of the text contained in the 
document.140 This view is corroborated by the respective own legal assessment of major 
JCPOA participants.141  Fischer and Scholl concur with Haupt as they also point to mentions 
of „voluntary commitments” in the JCPOA that support, according to Fischer and Scholl, the 
view that the text was designed not to create a priori legal obligations, but rather signal a 
political commitment. Similarly, the fact that the JCPOA may only take effect after 90 days 
following Security Council endorsement is also cited in support of this view.142 The JCPOA is, 
hence, viewed both by legal scholars and practitioners as an intricate form of political 
accord.143  This architecture has arguably cleared the way for the accord as a treaty would 
have required ratification by each domestic legislature, which could have possibly created 
political challenges.144 While the JCPOA itself cannot, if these arguments were accepted, be 
considered, as such, as legally binding, the Security Council endorsement of Resolution 
2231, which on the basis of  and by invocation of Article 41 and Article 25 of the UN Charter, 
sets out to make binding numerous commitments that are contained in the JCPOA. 
    
b. Relationship of the JCPOA with UN Security Council Resolutions 
Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council „may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
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complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations“.145 
Before it takes measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council must 
determine the existence of „a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression“ 
in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter.146 UN Security Council Chapter VII decisions 
are binding on all UN Member States according to Article 25 of the UN Charter. Under Article 
48 (2) of the UN Charter, UN Member States are also required to carry out Security Council 
decisions through their membership in international organisations.147  O´Connell argues that 
the Security Council has on that basis broad authority to impose sanctions.148 Boon notes 
that while Article 41 of the UN Charter does not mention sanctions explicitly, it gives the 
Security Council what may be termed a „preventative“ power to be used whenever it may be 
necessary to protect international peace and security.149 Boon suggests with a view to UN 
Security Council practice that it has shown creativity in exploiting the Article 41 provisions.150 
Tzanakopoulos specifies that the Security Council has used its „sanctioning powers“ of 
Article 41 in the past in many different ways, including „to affect international treaties, to 
create war tribunals, to decide in the responsibility of Member States or even to „legislate“ for 
all Member States“.151  
As has been shown, the UN Security Council has passed numerous subsequent resolutions 
imposing sanctions on Iran.152 The JCPOA, in turn, provides for sanctions-lifting, including 
those sanctions that where previously instituted by the UN Security Council. To that end, the 
JCPOA made reference in many instances to a new Security Council resolution, that JCPOA 
participants would put forward.153 E3+3 countries have accordingly committed in the JCPOA 
to table a resolution in the Security Council that shall endorse the JCPOA.154 This resolution 
has been adopted on July 20, 2015.155  
The structure of Resolution 2231 is such that it consists of a preamble, an operative part and 
two Annexes (A and B).156 The JCPOA text has been annexed to Security Council Resolution 
2231 as Annex A.157 Annex B is a statement that China, France, Germany, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union have made on 
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July 14, 2015 in which they outline certain provisions as regards the implementation of the 
nuclear accord.158 In the operative part of Resolution 2231, Security Council members have 
voted to endorse the JCPOA and urged participants to fully implement it in accordance with 
the timetable set in the JCPOA.159  
The Security Council with Resolution 2231 has, by virtue of the language it uses in some 
instances (e.g. „decides”), purported to solidify or make binding crucial provisions of the 
JCPOA. In Resolution 2231, the Security Council takes decisions in 10 out of 30 operative 
paragraphs, acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter.160 Crucially, UNSCR 2231 decides to 
terminate Security Council-mandated UN-sanctions imposed on Iran previously.161 
Additionally, UNSCR 2231 under Article 11 and Article 12 decides to institute the „snap-
mechanism” as provided for in the JCPOA.162  
According to Haupt, it is important to note that the operative part of UNSCR 2231 does not 
fully reproduce the contents of Annexes A and B. The reason for this, in his view, is that the 
Security Council had the intention to give those provisions of the JCPOA, that are explicitly 
mentioned in UNSCR 2231, strictu sensu, legally binding effect.163  
It is, however, debated whether the binding effect did only apply to selected provisions of the 
JCPOA as produced in the operative part of UNSCR 2231.  
In view of all sanctions that might be in place nationally against Iran and that are not based 
on previous UNSCR resolutions, the Resolution 2231, in paragraph 2, only „calls upon all 
Members States […] to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the 
implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the 
implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions 
that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA”.164 
According to Fischer and Scholl, this does nonetheless not necessarily preclude a legally 
binding effect of that provision.165 In doing so, they cite the Namibia Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice where the court has pointed out that Article 25 of the UN 
Charter, which obliges UN members to carry out decisions of the UN Security Council, does 
not solely apply if the Security Council takes decisions on the basis of Article 41 and 42.166 In 
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Recital 115 of the Namibia opinion the Court has considered a paragraph of a Security 
Council resolution to be „binding”. In a legal opinion for the US Congress, Mulligan analyses 
the same legal problem. On paragraph 2 of UNSCR 2231 he comments:  
„While this provision arguably seeks general compliance with the JCPOA, some 
commentators interpret the phrase „calls upon” as a hortatory, nonbinding expression in 
Security Council parlance. Others argue that the phrase can create an obligation under 
international law to comply. And a third group falls in between, describing the phrase as 
purposefully ambiguous or dependent on its context”.167 According to Mulligan, who also 
refers to the lessons from the Namibia opinion the binding effect cannot be conclusively 
established: „Since the ICJ’s opinion, U.N. Member States have ascribed varying levels of 
significance to the phrase „calls upon” in subsequent Security Council resolutions. 
Consequently, there is no clear answer to whether Resolution 2231 creates an obligation to 
comply with the JCPOA that is binding as a matter of international law”.168  
Fischer and Scholl, on the contrary, do further argue that the call for the lifting of national 
sanctions has received binding character already thanks to the interlink between JCPOA and 
UNSCR 2231. The argument recalls that the JCPOA as a whole does take effect 90 days 
after endorsement by the Security Council. This has happened October 18, 2015 as the 
UNSCR 2231 was successfully passed on July 20, 2015. If, as runs their argument, the 
formulation in paragraph 34 of the JCPOA is construed in such a way that participating 
countries have agreed to the binding nature of the text on condition of Security Council 
endorsement, the binding effect of JCPOA has materialised 90 days after the adoption of 
UNSCR 2231.169 That, they concede, may only be applicable to those provisions in the 
JCPOA, which are clearly and unambiguously phrased to create binding commitments.170    
While some authors have accepted that the JCPOA does by virtue of adoption of UNSCR 
2231 contain legally binding provisions, anchored in international law, their extent cannot be 
conclusively determined and may remain a source for legal debate.  
 
c. Link of the JCPOA to other International Legal Instruments 
The JCPOA does contain a series of references to other international legal instruments. 
These mentions are in most instances specific and clear, but are, however, in limited 
instances of a more general nature. In the preface to the JCPOA, mention is made that Iran 
shall be allowed a peaceful nuclear programme „consistent with international non-
proliferation norms”.171 This is further elaborated in the pertinent paragraph of the JCPOA, 
where Iran´s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in line with the provisions of the Non-
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Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a state party, is reaffirmed.172 Reference is also made to 
the UN Charter.173 Under the heading „Transparency and Confidence Building Measures” 
Iran does commit to apply provisionally the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).174 This Protocol 
does extend the monitoring and verification powers of the IAEA with respect to Iran.175 This 
commitment is further specified in Annex V of the JCPOA.176 Links between JCPOA and the 
IAEA are reinforced by means of UNSCR 2231.177 Other references include a commitment of 
the US to treat Iran eight years after Adoption Day consistent with the US approach to a non-
nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.178 Reference is also made to 
potential future technical cooperation projects, that may be concluded by way of bilateral or 
plurilateral treaty. This would have to be in accordance with JCPOA.179 Mention is also made 
of possible future cooperation agreement in the area of nuclear safety.180 Interestingly, a 
dedicated paragraph of the JCPOA does voluntarily stipulate limits on the scope of the 
JCPOA: „All provisions and measures should not be considered as setting precedents for 
any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and 
obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally 
recognised principles and practises”.181  
 
d. The JCPOA and International Organisations 
The JCPOA gives an important role to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).182 
Reference to the authority is made on numerous occasions in the text.183 The IAEA will be 
requested to verify and monitor all the nuclear-related commitments Iran has entered into 
with the adoption of the JCPOA.184 Note that this mandate is also echoed in UNSCR 2231.185 
                                               
172
 JCPOA, iv and vii, p. 3 
173
 JCPOA, vi, p. 3 
174
 JCPOA, paragraph 13, p. 8 
175
 IAEA, 2018 (1) and IAEA, 2018 (2); Rosenthal, 2016, p. 99; for a good analysis of the precepts of the IAEA 
Additional Protocol, see, Asada, 2016 
176
 JCPOA, Annex V, paragraph 8 and 22, p. 1,5 
177
 Haupt, 2016, p. 422-426 
178
 JCPOA, paragraph 24, p. 13 
179
 JCPOA, Annex III, paragraph 2, p. 1 
180
 JCPOA, Annex III, paragraph 8.1, p. 5 
181
 JCPOA, xi, p. 4 
182
 Rosenthal, 2016, p. 99,100 
183
 JCPOA, x, p. 4; xiii, p. 4; paragraph 1, 2, 4, p. 6; paragraph 6, p. 7; paragraph 14, p. 8; paragraph 15, p. 9; 
paragraph 18, 19, p. 10; paragraph 20, 21, p. 11; paragraph 23, p. 12; paragraph 32, p. 15; paragraph 34, p. 16;  
Annex 1, paragraph 2, 3, p. 2;  paragraph 6, 8, p. 3;  paragraph 10, 12, p. 4; paragraph 15, p. 15; paragraph 46.1, 
p. 12; paragraph  48.2, 51, p. 13; paragraph 57, p. 15; paragraph  60, p. 16; paragraph 63, p. 17; paragraph 64, 
65, p. 18; paragraph 66, p. 19; paragraph  67.1, 67.2, 67.3, p. 20; paragraph 68, 69, p. 21; paragraph  70, 71, p. 
22; paragraph 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, p. 23; paragraph  79, 80.1, 80.2, p. 25; paragraph  81, p. 26; Annex III, 
paragraph 1, 3.2, p. 1; paragaph 5.4, 6.1, p.3; paragraph 7.4.3, p. 4; paragraph 8, 9, p. 5; paragraph 9.2, p. 6;  
Annex IV, paragraph 2.1.8, p. 2; paragraph 6.4.1, p. 4; paragraph 6.4.6; Annex V, paragraph 5, 8, p. 1; paragraph 
10, 14, p. 2; paragraph 15.9, p. 3; paragraph 19, p. 4   
184
 JCPOA, xi, p. 4; JCPOA, paragraph 15, p. 9 
 21 
 
This includes, notably, that the JCPOA confers upon the IAEA the powers to monitor Iran´s 
uranium mines and mills.186 In addition, Iran must place all of the country´s uranium ore 
concentrate under IAEA´s „containment and surveillance measures” at Iran´s uranium 
conversions facility.187 In addition, the JCPOA requires Iran to allow IAEA-monitoring of 
rotors and bellows and IAEA-inspections of Iran´s heavy-water plant.188 In executing the 
JCPOA-mandate to verify Iran´s compliance with the JCPOA, the IAEA can also activitate a 
process if they have specific concerns regarding undeclared nuclear material or activities on 
part of Iran. So even going beyond access requests for sites that have been notified to the 
agency under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, the IAEA may ask Iran to 
grant access to locations where the agency has concerns about undeclared nuclear 
materials or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA.189 If Iran fails to accommodate IAEA-
requests for access to a specific Iranian facility, the IAEA could call on the Joint Commission 
that may, by majority decision, grant access to to Iranian facilities for inspection purposes.190 
In addition, the JCPOA provides for a long-term IAEA-presence in Iran, which is designed to 
facilitate and expedite rapid IAEA-inspector access to Iranian facilities.191  
All these provisions shall ensure that the assessment of JCPOA implementation can be 
based on facts. Fact-finding and verification, with a particular focus on the timely 
implementation of JCPOA commitments on part of Iran, remain the most important function 
of the IAEA.192 Accordingly, progress in fullfilling the JCPOA implementation plan is, at 
decisive junctures, tied to positive IAEA-reports that certify honest implementation of nuclear-
related commitments on part of Iran.193  
 
C. The European Union and the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (JCPOA) 
I. The Role of the EU in Respect of the JCPOA  
a. The EU´s Involvement in the Nuclear Deal 
aa. Actors 
In line with the pertinent treaty provisions, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy („the High Representative“) shall conduct the Union´s Common 
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Foreign and Security Policy („CFSP“).194 Accordingly, the High Representative conducts 
„political dialogue with third parties on the Union´s behalf“.195  
While the High Representative is, thus, the Union´s agent in direct negotations with Iran and 
in the framework of the E3/EU+3, other European Union institutions have, for their part, also 
had a role to play in line with competences conferred upon them in the Treaties. Accordingly, 
the European Council shall identify the Union´s strategic interest in the context of the CFSP, 
determine the objectives and define the general guidelines for action while the Council shall 
frame the CFSP and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the 
basis of these general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.196  
The rules and procedures governing this decision-making as well as various forms of action 
are laid down in the TEU.197 Most notably, in most cases unanimity applies.198  
The Council has adopted conclusions and taken decisons in respect of Iran on numerous 
occasions, including in the context of the JCPOA as will be further elaborated.199  
 
bb. Mandate 
The European Union in accordance with the Treaty on European Union (TEU) operates on 
the international scene by means of its External Action policy, more specifically its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy („CFSP“).200 All this action has to be based on a specific 
competence as stipulated in pertinent Treaty provisions.201 Accordingly, the Union shall only 
act „within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties“.202 The Treaties give the EU the power to adopt restrictive measures in pursuit of 
CFSP objectives. Restrictive measures are governed by Article 75 and 215 TFEU.203 Article 
215 para. 1 TFEU states: „Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V 
of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or 
completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary 
measures“. This means that, under the terms of Article 215 TFEU, legal effect will be given to 
a CFSP decision by means of a formal EU legal act („EU Council Regulation and/or Council 
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Implementing Regulation“). For this prior CFSP decision, adopted in accordance with 
Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, having regard in particular to Articles 
29 and 31 TEU, unanimity is required. On the purpose of preventing and combatting 
terrorism and related activities, Article 75 TFEU enables the European Parliament and the 
Council to adopt regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure that shall 
define a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital movements and 
payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains belonging to, or 
owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities. The Council, on a 
proposal from the Commission, will adopt further measures to implement the former 
framework.204  
It is important to note that according to Article 275 TFEU, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has no jurisdiction in regards to provisions that relate to the CFSP and in regards to 
acts that are based on those provisions.205 However, the ECJ does have jurisdiction to 
review the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal 
persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union. In addition, Declaration No. 25 on Articles 75 and 215 of the TFEU recalls 
that the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms demands that proper attention is given 
to the protection and observance of the due process rights of the individuals or entities 
concerned.206 For this purpose and in order to guarantee a thorough judicial review of 
decisions subjecting an individual or entity to restrictive measures, such decisions must be 
based on clear and distinct criteria. Note that the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
uses the terms „sanctions“ and „restrictive measures“ interchangeably, describing them as 
measures designed „to bring about a change in activities or policies such as violations of 
international law“.207  
 
cc. The Nuclear Deal and Europan Union Law  
By means of its Council conclusions on July 20, 2015 the Council adopted the JCPOA.208  
Subsequent to this, the European Union formally adopted the legal acts required to lift all EU 
economic and financial sanctions relating to Iran´s nuclear programme
 
in line with the 
provisions of the JCPOA. In doing so, the European Union implements UN Security Council 
resolution 2231 (2015).
 
Note that while the lifting of the sanctions took effect on 
Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), the EU, in line with its commitments under the 
JCPOA, adopted the required legal acts already on Adoption Day (October 18, 2015), 
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stipulating a delayed application.209 Consequently, the bulk of the EU legislative action on  
October 18, 2015 produced effect only on Implementation Day (January 16, 2016).  
Legally this sequence was implemented as follows: Already following the Council 
conclusions of July 20, 2015, the Council on July 31, 2015 and on the basis of Article 29 TEU 
decided (Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1336) to amend the Council Regulation No. 
267/2012 that gives effect to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive 
measures against Iran.210 On the same day, the Council passed a regulation that gives effect 
to the aforementioned decision. In the recital, it says: „Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 
gives effect to the measures provided for in Decision 2010/413/CFSP. On 31 July 2015, the 
Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/1336 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP providing 
for certain measures in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 2231 (2015) endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the 
Iran nuclear issue and providing for actions to take place in accordance with the JCPOA“.211 
The wording „providing for certain measures“ indicates that more measures and thus 
additional legal acts were to follow. On October 18, 2015 further legal acts were then 
adopted to amend Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP
 
and Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012.  
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 amending Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran establishes the suspension of 
the those provisions of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP that concern all EU economic and 
financial sanctions as specified in the JCPOA.212 The Council Decision also provides for the 
suspension of the asset freeze as well as for the suspension of visa ban measures for 
persons and entities. Furthermore, an authorisation regime in view of nuclear-related 
transfers and transfers of certain metals and software is introduced. Aforementioned Council 
Decision is implemented by two Regulations. On the one hand, Council Regulation (EU) 
2015/1861 of 18 October 2015 amending Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning restrictive 
measures against Iran implements legally the lifting of all EU economic and financial 
sanctions relating to Iran´s nuclear programme by deleting the respective articles of Council 
Regulation (EU) 267/2012.213 On the other hand, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1862 of 18 October 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) 267/2012 concerning 
restrictive measures against Iran then implements Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 to the 
extent that it lifts the restrictive measures in place against individuals and entities as laid 
down in Annexes V (UN listings) and VI (autonomous listings) to Decision 2010/413/CFSP.214  
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On January 16, 2016 („Implementation Day“), the Council of the EU then acknowledged the 
report of the IAEA-Director-General, addressed to the IAEA-Board of Governors and to the 
UN Security Council, which confirmed that Iran had implemented its commitments under the 
JCPOA. Consequently, the Council Decision, Regulation and Implementing Regulation came 
into effect on the same day. With Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/37 of 16 January 2016 
concerning the date of application of Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863, EU economic and financial 
sanctions taken with respect to Iran´s nuclear programme
 
were lifted.215 On that same day, 
the EU published in its Official Journal a notice to confirm that the legislation adopted on 
Adoption Day took effect. Note that a set of specific sanctions which the EU put in place 
against Iran, notably in view of the human rights situation in Iran and its alleged support for 
terrorism, are not part of the JCPOA, and do therefore remain in place.  
 
b. The EU´s Role in the JCPOA Framework 
aa. Joint Commission 
In accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA, the EU takes part in the work of the Joint 
Commission, as described in section B.I.b.cc of this thesis. Within this Joint Commission the 
EU shall assume a coordination function, with the High Representative to be designated 
Coordinator of the Joint Commission.216 The JCPOA provides that the Coordinator of the 
Joint Commission shall convene the meetings of the Joint Commission.217  
 
bb. Coordination Function 
The coordination function of the High Representative in the Joint Commission is regulated in 
specific provisions of Annex IV.218 First reference to it is made in paragraph 1.4 of the 
JCPOA.219 The coordination function includes procedurally to ensure that meetings of the 
Joint Commission take place on a quarterly basis or at any time upon request of a JCPOA 
participant.220 It is the responsibility of the Coordinator to receive and act upon these 
requests and to make sure that the timetable requirements are duly respected.221 The role 
extends to the transfer of information within the Joint Commission so as to facilitate dialogue 
within the group. Correspondingly, the High Representative is responsible to circulate, at any 
time, notifications from a JCPOA participant to the respective others.222 While each JCPOA 
participant has one vote in the Joint Commission, the High Representative will, as 
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Coordinator, not take part in decision-making as set out in section 6 of Annex IV.223 The High 
Representative will also serve as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group as 
specified in the Article 6.3 of Annex IV.224 In this capacity, the High Representative will 
receive communications by the other JCPOA participants as to whether they approve of 
proposals under the procurement channel.225 For its part, the High Representative serves as 
the link between the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission and the UN 
Security Council as the High Representative sends communications relating to 
recommendations from the Procurement Working Group to the UN Security Council.226 
Additionally, the High Representative will also coordinate work of the Working Group on the 
Implementation of Sanctions Lifting.227  
 
II. The EU´s Commitments in the Context of the JCPOA 
a. The Rights and Obligations of the EU under the JCPOA 
The most notable obligation of the EU includes its commitment to sanctions-lifting as 
described in a previous chapter and in line with the timetable set in the implementation 
plan.228 This commitment, along with a like US-pledge, is an important cornerstone of the 
JCPOA´s  architecture.229 In that regard, the EU pledged to undertake respective associated 
commitments so as to ensure consistent and good faith execution of the agreement.230 This 
includes, most notably, a commitment not to undermine the effects of this sanctions-lifting231 
as well as specific provisions on sanctions targeted at individuals or companies.232 Similarly, 
the EU undertakes a commitment to dispute resolution in line with a dispute resolution 
mechanism provided for in this JCPOA if need may be.233 The EU obliges itself to become a 
part of the Joint Commission that shall oversee the implementation of the JCPOA.234 
Moreover, the EU undertakes to cooperate with Iran in the field of peaceful use of nuclear 
energy coupled with several associated commitments.235  
Furthermore, the EU commits to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the implementation 
plan.236 In turn, the agreement confers certain rights upon the EU. Notably, the JCPOA gives 
the EU the right to coordinate the work of the Joint Commission, including full access to all 
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information necessary for the work therein.237 The EU shall take part in the ministerial 
meetings every two years that the JCPOA provides for.238 By means of its inclusion in the so 
called „international partnership“ that will facilitate efforts to modernize the reactor at Arak 
(Iran), the EU will have the right to be involved in specific matters that concern nuclear 
cooperation with Iran as provided for in Annex III.239 Additionally, the EU has rights with 
respect to matters related to sanctions-lifting and it has been given rights in the context of 
dispute resolution mechanism that the JCPOA provides for.240 These rights include the ability 
to initiate a Joint Commission investigation should the EU have grounds to believe that Iran 
is not respecting its commitments under the JCPOA.241 The EU, if acting as complaining 
JCPOA participant and after having exhausted the dispute resolution process that the 
JCPOA provides for, may refer the matter in question to the Security Council for 
consideration, which would have to make a resolution to continue the sanctions-lifting.242  
 
b. Sanctions 
The parties to this agreement commit themselves upon adoption of the agreement to 
terminate a range of specific sanctions that were previously instituted by, notably, the UN 
Security Council, the US and the EU with reference to the Iranian nuclear programme. 
Consequently, the EU does commit to terminate the nuclear-related sanctions the Union has 
imposed on Iran in accordance with the relevant JCPOA provisions. Paragraph 19 of the 
JCPOA enumerates a list of areas that prior to the JCPOA were subject to EU sanctions that 
shall be terminated as a consequence of the JCPOA.243 Another set of EU sanctions that 
relate to proliferation are to be ended eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has 
come to the conclusion „that all nuclear material in Iran serves peaceful purposes, whichever 
is earlier“.244   
A complete list of all sanctions that are to be terminated or disapplied are attached to the 
JCPOA in Annex II.245 The EU and the US commit to refrain from the introduction of new 
nuclear-related sanctions against Iran and to undertake good faith execution of the 
agreement.246 Other commitments of the EU and the E3+3 countries include, as has been 
pointed out, a pledge to cooperate with Iran in field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as is 
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detailed further in Annex  III. This might be achieved by means of technical cooperation 
projects.247    
 
c. Support (Civil Nuclear Cooperation) 
The EU and E3+3 countries have committed to cooperate with Iran „in the field of peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy“.248 Mention is made of „mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation 
projects“.249 The details of this cooperation are further specified in Annex III.250 Annex III sets 
out the framework and the scope for cooperation of E3/EU+3 parties with Iran, lay down 
ground rules for such cooperation, and identify a set of areas where this cooperation could 
be envisaged.251 The EU, along with the other parties, commits in particular, next to exploring 
potential areas of cooperation as listed in Annex III, to become part of an „international 
partnership“ that shall „support and facilitate the redesign and rebuilding of the IR-40 reactor 
at Arak“.252 Details of the EU´s commitments with regards to the Arak modernization project 
can be found in Annex I. Commitments include to join aforementioned international 
partnership as a member of a dedicated Working Group that shall together with Iran 
implement the Arak modernisation project.253 Concretely, the EU and the other members of 
international partnership, shall support „the purchase by Iran, the transfer and supply of 
necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and technologies 
required for the construction of the redesigned reactor“ and „through exploration of relevant 
funding contributions“.254 Support will also be lent to Iran in aspects related to uranium stocks 
and fuels and spent fuel reprocessing activites.255  
Besides the Arak modernization project, the EU has taken on commitments to support Iran 
with regards to nuclear fuel, with regards to research and development practices where 
scientific exchange on a number of nuclear-related issues has been specifically identified, 
and with regards to the establishment of a Nuclear Safety Center in Iran.256 Additionally, the 
EU has committed to facilitate exchange between EU nuclear regulatory authorities and 
Iranian counterparts, and to cooperate more broadly with Iran in the areas of nuclear safety 
and security.257 Cooperation in the field of nuclear medicine as in waste management and 
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facility decommissioning are also listed.258 Under the heading „Other projects“, Annex III 
enumerates few other potential areas for cooperation.259  
 
III. Legal Aspects of the EU´s Effort to save the Nuclear Deal  
a. The US Departure from the JCPOA 
On October 13, 2017, US-President Trump gave a speech in which he outlined his 
Administration’s strategy toward Iran and denounced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA).260 A long term critic of the JCPOA, President Trump announced in the same 
speech that he will not renew certification of Iran´s continued compliance with the JCPOA. 
The US-President, in line with this announcement, consequently withheld this certification on 
January 12, 2018.261 This did not, as such, immediately terminate the US commitments 
under the JCPOA. The obligation on part of the President to certify Iran´s compliance with 
the JCPOA stems from the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act.262 Since the Obama 
Administration has considered the JCPOA as a nonbinding political commitment, it followed 
that express congressional consent was not required.  
Congress did however adopt the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act that gives it certain 
powers of oversight and review with regards to the JCPOA.263 Among other provisions, the 
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act requires the US-President to certify every 90 days that 
„Iran (i) is fully implementing the JCPOA; (ii) has not committed an uncured, material breach 
of the plan of action; (iii) has not taken action that could significantly advance its nuclear 
weapons program; and (iv) that the continued suspension of sanctions under the JCPOA is 
vital to the national security interests of the United States and is „appropriate and 
proportionate“ in view of Iran’s measures to terminate its nuclear weapons programme“.264 
The Act authorizes Congress to swiftly pass legislation reinstating all US sanctions, that the 
US-President lifted in implementation of the JCPOA, if the US-President decided not to 
certify.265 Similarly, the US-President has the power under current domestic US law to 
terminate US participation in the JCPOA and to reinstate US sanctions on Iran. This can be 
done either by means of an executive order or by declining to renew statutory waivers.266  
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On May 8, 2018, US-President Donald Trump then declared that the United States will 
withdraw from the JCPOA.267 On August 6, 2018, the US-President gave orders to reimpose 
sanctions against Iran.268 A first series of sanctions came into effect August 7, 2018 while 
another set of sanctions („all remaining nuclear-related sanctions“) became effective 
November 5, 2018.  
 
b.  International Reactions  
The Russian government released a statement in which it expressed its „deep 
disappointment“ with US-President Trumps decision to unilaterally give up US commitments 
to implement the JCPOA. Russia recalled that Iran is „strictly abiding with the obligations it 
has undertaken which is regularly confirmed by IAEA“ and reaffirmed that Russia remains 
„open to further cooperation with other JCPOA participants“.269  China also made it known 
that it will remain committed to the JCPOA.270 Iran has announced that the deal has a future 
if they receive enough practical guarantees from the three European countries, but did not 
fail to issue clear warnings if that cannot be achieved.271  
In response, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to the JCPOA. In this regard, the 
E3 as well as the E3 together with the High Representative on behalf of the EU repeatedly 
resorted to the adoption of declarations to make known its views. This merits closer 
inspection.  
While declarations play an important role in EU practice and have become the most regular 
means by which the EU has made its voice heard, they are not official instruments of the 
CFSP as defined in Articles 23-41 TEU. Declarations therefore have no formal legal effects, 
but are a statement expressing the EU´s position on foreign affairs. Van Vooren and Wessels 
have characterised declarations pointedly as a form of „informal instrument“.272  
The responsibility for issuing declarations on behalf of the Union lies with the High 
Representative as Article 18 (2) TEU states that the High Representative is responsible for 
the conduct of the CFSP.273 However, given the special provisions applicable to the CFSP 
which underline the intergovernmental characteristics of the policy, a declaration is only 
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issued after consultation with Member States since they are issued in the name of the EU 
and its Member States.  The annual report of the High Representative on CFSP offers some 
insights into the procedures and practices that govern EU practise with regards to the issuing 
of declarations. Accordingly, „declarations issued by the High Representative on behalf of the 
EU reflect the official positions of the EU and are issued under the authority of High 
Representative with prior consultation of the Member States. Where no such official positions 
exist, these declarations are agreed by Member States within the Council“.274 Declarations of 
the EU can therefore be said to require the input and the consent of the Member States 
before they can be issued. Once a declaration is agreed, selected third states are invited to 
align themselves with the declaration. Once this is finalised, the declaration is placed on the 
press release section of the website of the Council.275 
With respect to the US departure from the JCPOA, it was the heads of government of 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, who issued a statement regretting US-President 
Trumps decision while upholding the E3 continued commitment to the JCPOA.276 The 
European powers recalled: „Together, we emphasize our continuing commitment to the 
JCPOA. This agreement remains important for our shared security. We recall that the 
JCPOA was unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2231. This 
resolution remains the binding international legal framework for the resolution of the dispute 
about the Iranian nuclear programme. We urge all sides to remain committed to its full 
implementation and to act in a spirit of responsibility“. 
On the future of the JCPOA, the E3 professed: „Therefore we, the E3, will remain parties to 
the JCPOA. Our governments remain committed to ensuring the agreement is upheld, and 
will work with all the remaining parties to the deal to ensure this remains the case, including 
through ensuring the continuing economic benefits to the Iranian people that are linked to the 
agreement“. The E3 also highlight that the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that Iran continues 
to honour its commitments under the JCPOA.277  
In the same statement, the E3 call on the US to avoid taking steps which obstructs full 
implementation by all other parties to the deal.278 
Following this initial statement by the E3 heads of government, the High Representative and 
the foreign ministers of the E3 issued on August 6, 2018 a joint statement in which they 
deeply regret the reimposition of US sanctions by the US and addressed concerns that the 
re-imposition of US sanctions created.279 The joint declaration of High Representative and E3 
ministers notes: „The remaining parties to the JCPOA have committed to work on, inter alia, 
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the preservation and maintenance of effective financial channels with Iran, and the 
continuation of Iran´s export of oil and gas...Preserving the nuclear deal with Iran is a matter 
of respecting international agreements and a matter of international security“.280 
In the same statement, the High Representive and the E3 ministers declared that they are 
„determined to protect economic operators engaged in legitimate business with Iran“.281 This 
determination then translated into legal action with the updating of the EU blocking statute.   
 
c.  The Update of the EU Blocking Statute 
On June 6, 2018, the European Commission adopted an update of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2271/96, the so called „blocking statute“.282  
The blocking statute was orginally created in 1996 when the US took measures concerning 
Cuba, Iran and Libya that in effect attempted an extra-territorial application of US laws, 
including sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya. According to the European Commission, 
„it protects EU operators engaged in lawful international trade and or movement of capital, as 
well as related commercial activities, against the effects of the extra-territorial legislation 
specified in its Annex“.283 In concrete terms, Article 5 (1) of the blocking statute „prohibits EU 
operators from complying with the legislation listed in the blocking statute that has 
extraterritorial effect, or with any decision, ruling, or award based thereon, given that the EU 
does not recognise its applicability to or effects towards EU operators“.284 This operates in 
practice by means of nullifying the effect in the EU of any foreign court ruling which bases 
itself on those foreign laws that are listed in the annex of the blocking statute. 285 The 
blocking statute additionally creates an obligation for European companies to alert the 
European Commission within 30 days should their economic or financial interests be 
negatively impacted, directly or indirectly.286 In case that EU nationals and companies do 
have their interests adversely affected, the statute provides a right to recover lost 
compensation. Accordingly, „EU operators are allowed to recover in court damages caused 
by the extra-territorial application of the specified foreign laws“ on the basis of Article 6 
blocking statute.287 With the updated blocking statute, the EU took account of the US 
extraterritorial sanctions. 
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Yet, in practical terms, reinstated US sanctions, regardless of EU action and the blocking 
statute, created significant real impediments for economic operators.288 Hence, the E3+EU 
intensified efforts to save the nuclear deal. On September 24, 2018 a ministerial meeting 
under chairmanship of the High Representative took place in New York in which all 
remaining JCPOA participants „reconfirmed their commitment to full and effective 
implementation [of the JCPOA]“.289 The ministers noted the importance of tangible results, 
especially with reference to the maintenance and development of payment channels in view 
of reinstated US sanctions.290 Ministers welcomed the initiative to establish a so called 
„Special Purpose Vehicle“ and pledged support to its operationalisation.291  
 
d. Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
Special Purpose Vehicles are legal entities with no employees and no locations, created by a 
sponsor to act as a managing and operating company for projects.292 The SPV legal entity is 
usually set up as an „orphan company“ with professional directors provided by an 
administration company or institution. Chowdhuran and Chen note that „all legal and financial 
agreements with various parties and stakeholders of a project are accorded with the SPV, 
thus it acts as an entity for legal manifestation of a project consortium“.293 As a consequence, 
a contractual network may revolve around the SPV.  
On November 2, 2018,  the High Representative and E3 foreign and finance ministers issued 
a statement in which they indicated the establishment of such „Special Purpose Vehicle“ 
which shall „enable continued sanctions-lifting to reach Iran and allow for European exporters 
and importers to pursue legitimate trade“.294 According to the High Representative, the 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SVP) established by the E3 is devised to be a legal entity „to 
facilitate payments related to Iran´s exports and financial transactions with Iran“ in order „to 
allow European companies to continue trade with this country…the mechanism will also be 
made available to global partners“. 295 The SVP will be designed in way so as „to handle 
transactions between companies and their Iranian trade partners without being transparent to 
US authorities, and thus not be subject to US sanctions“.296 On January 31, 2019, the E3 
foreign ministers then announced the creation of INSTEX, the special purpose vehicle aimed 
at facilitating legitimate trade with Iran as part of the efforts to preserve the JCPOA.297 
Council conclusions of February 4, 2019 have welcomed the creation of INSTEX and 
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confirmed EU support for it.298  
INSTEX is based in France and managed by a German banker. Its supervisory board 
consists of diplomats from the E3 countries.299 INSTEX is a „Société par actions simplifiée“ 
(simplified joint stock company) under French law.300 It is set up to function as a transaction 
tool. Whilst it is not meant to be a bank, it will not allow for any direct cross border (EU-Iran) 
financial transfers. Devised as a platform for recording transactions and claims of EU 
exporters and importers that result from commercial transactions with Iran, INSTEX will 
facilate the settlement of these claims. This is being done by advising EU importers and 
exporters which use INSTEX to bilaterally settle their respective claims within the EU.301 Iran 
has welcomed INSTEX as a first step in E3 implementation of their May 2018 
commitments.302 In April 2019, Iran set up the required counterparty, the „Special Trade and 
Finance Instrument” (STFI).303 
On November 29, 2019 Norway, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands became 
shareholders of INSTEX.304 This step marks a visible sign of commitment to continous 
European support for the agreement and the ongoing efforts to facilitate legitimate trade 
between Europe and Iran. The mechanism subsequently sought to speed up its operation 
with a view to support Iran with the COVID-19 pandemic.305  
On March 31, 2020 the German Federal Foreign Office announced that INSTEX has 
completed its first transaction.306 
 
e.  Iran breaches the JCPOA: Consequences under the JCPOA 
On May 8, 2019 Iran announced that it will no longer be bound by limits on heavy water and 
uranium stockpiles. As has been demonstrated, this is in breach of Article XX, JCPOA.  
On July 1, 2019, Iran announced that it has exceeded the limitations on its enriched uranium 
stockpiles. Until the end of 2019, four other specific instances of breaches of the JCPOA 
were documented by the IAEA, including the resumption of uranium enrichment at the 
Fordow plant, that was prohibited under the JCPOA.307 At first, violations have been relatively 
minor, but Iran did aggravate violations, so that they are widely viewed as being „serious“.  
On December 6, 2019, there was a Joint Commission meeting (E3+2 and Iran) under the 
chairmanship of the EU in Vienna. The chair notes in statement that all parties „emphasized 
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the key importance of full and effective implementation by all sides as well as their 
determination to pursue all efforts to preserve the agreement“.308 This effectively echoed the 
joint statement after a ministerial meeting of E3+2 and Iran foreign ministers in New York of 
September 2019.309 At the time of writing of this thesis, E3+EU were still committed to 
upholding the JCPOA. However, in view of Iran´s repeated breaches of the JCPOA, the E3 
have triggered the dispute resolution mechanism that the JCPOA provides for. This process 
is still ongoing, the timeline for resolution has been extended, owing to the complexity of the 
issues involved as their press release reads.310 
 
D. Conclusion 
I. Assessment of the Nuclear Deal in the Literature  
The European Union and its Member States have viewed the Iranian nuclear deal as a 
success of their diplomacy. Note also that reference to the nuclear deal is made in the EU´s 
grand foreign policy strategy where it is mentioned as an example of successful use of 
combined weight of its Member States to promote agreed rules to certain power politics and 
contribute to a peaceful, fair, and prosperous world.311 In analysing the hitherto existing 
implementation of the JCPOA, Lohmann, Meier and Zamirirad argued in 2017 that structures 
and mechanisms of the accord would work and would serve their purpose.312  The IAEA has, 
for the longest time since the conclusion of the JCPOA, repeatedly certified Iranian 
compliance with the commitments it has undertaken under the JCPOA. Brzoska and 
Neuneck recalled that the strengthening of verification, which is embedded in the nuclear 
accord, could serve as a role model of confidence building in the region.313 They argued that 
the nuclear deal with Iran was a success for patient and well coordinated diplomacy. A 
dangerous crisis had been defused.  Meier-Walser, in noting the most salient benefit of the 
conclusion of the JCPOA, pointed out that with the accord a very dangerous conflict had 
been defused for the time being and escalation successfully prevented.314 Martellini and 
Zuchetti believed the agreement to make a relevant contribution to the combat against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as it showed a proportional balance of 
obligations and concessions. They also highlighted that the JCPOA insisted on the necessity 
of a well-designed verification mechanism. In the spirit of „trust, but verify“, the JCPOA by 
means of strengthened IAEA-monitoring allowed for quick detection if Iran pursued prohibited 
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nuclear-weapons related activity and research.315 Gärtner and Akbulut provided a realist 
assessment in 2017 as they noted that the JCPOA succeeded in eliciting countless 
commitments on the part of Iran, which operated as strict de-facto restrictions on its nuclear 
programme. That, along with the transparency and verification mechanisms the JCPOA 
provided for, made it an accord that reflected what had been realistic to achieve. 316 
Fikenscher concurred with this assessment as he stressed that the deal was a valuable 
achievement, especially as compared with the alternatives.317 Other authors have 
recommended more caution. Pabian suggested that the possibility of a covert Iranian nuclear 
programme, despite rigorous IAEA-monitoring, could not be ruled out completely, given 
Iran´s long-standing experience both in building the necessary infrastructure and in admitting 
to it only if the evidence was utterly overwhelming.318 Haupt saw the nuclear accord also as a 
balancing of the actors diverse interests, but argued that the final negotiated solution was 
beneficial for Iran.319   
On the exit of US from the JCPOA, Fiedler noted that it gave the EU the opportunity to have 
a more independent policy towards Iran. Iran, however, remained a challenging partner with 
potential domestic instability. Fiedler also saw a risk that big European corporations might be 
cautious to undertake sizeable investments in Iran in face of the reach of reinstated US 
sanctions. This could render European support for the JCPOA ineffective following the 
departure of the US.320 Osiewicz pointed out that, the US exit from the accord 
nothwithstanding, Iran still retained an interest in preserving European commitment to the 
JCPOA. Zamirirad suggested that the JCPOA strengthened proponents of a moderate 
approach to foreign policy in Iran to the detriment of more conservative political forces, who 
did not budge from their principled opposition to any kind of nuclear deal.321   
Yet credible European support to those forces in Iran that do want to stay in the JCPOA was 
instrumental. The recent registration of INSTEX is, according to her, „the bare minimum“, 
which was, despite being a politically important signal vis-à-vis Tehran, not enough. The 
danger of an Iranian drop-out of the JCPOA had not yet been averted.322 In a similar vein, 
Meier-Walser alluded to the fact that the power struggle in Iran that pits moderate pragmatics 
against conservative hardliners had not necessarily been won by the champions of the 
accord.323 The hardliners in Iran knew about the political tools to upset the nuclear deal´s 
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chances. Osiewicz notes that European support would, for example, be complicated if Iran 
crossed red lines with respect to its ballistic missile programme or non-compliance with the 
JCPOA.324 At the time of the writing of this thesis, Iran has begun to commit breaches of its 
commitments under the JCPOA as has been noted. This may also be viewed as a sign of 
growing Iranian frustration with the effectiveness of the EU´s efforts to protect the nuclear 
deal. How this plays out and how this will impact the overall assessment of the JCPOA 
remains to be seen.  
Meanwhile on August 20, 2020 the US attempted to activate the snap-back mechanism. The 
remaining JCPOA participants argued that the US is no longer entitled to activitate „snap-
back“ since it is no longer a JCPOA participant.325 Consequently, „the US notification to 
activate „snap-back“ is incapable of having any legal effect under international law and 
cannot bring into effect the snap-back procedure“.326    
 
II. Findings of this Thesis 
This master´s thesis has attempted to unpick and analyse the nuclear deal that the E3/EU+3 
have concluded with Iran. A special focus has been on the role of the European Union 
therein. In that, I have described notable elements, both material and procedural, of the 
JCPOA, its interlink with Security Council resolutions and reviewed, in detail, the genesis and 
legal basis for European Union involvement therein.   
It has been demonstrated that the JCPOA is, owing to the fact that there is convincing 
evidence to regard it as a political commitment, not legally binding as such. Negotiators had 
no intention to make the JCPOA a treaty. It is only by virtue of its relationship with Security 
Council Resolution 2231 that, as has been established, makes binding some, but not all of its 
provisions, in international law. Furthermore, this thesis has set out to retrace the multiple 
linkages and references that the JCPOA makes to international legal instruments and to 
expound what role it accords outside bodies, notably the IAEA, in the context of 
implementation of its own provisions.  
It has been found that European Union involvement in the nuclear deal can be related to and 
is commensurate with a long-standing foreign policy interest of the Union. This has been 
argued with reference both to the Treaties and subsequent EU strategies, including a 
dedicated EU WMD strategy. EU action in the framework of E3/EU+3 has been appreciated 
in the prism of the legal groundrules that govern EU foreign policy activity. In a similar vein, 
the legal mandate for the EU´s commitments under the JCPOA and the legal action that 
ensued on part of the EU in pursuit of consequent JCPOA implementation, notably in the 
area of sanction retraction, have been examined. Owing to the topicality of recent political 
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developments surrounding the JCPOA, this thesis was also able to depict the legal aspects 
of the latest European efforts to save the nuclear deal with Iran. Of particular interest, next to 
the political intent, were consequently the legal auxiliaries the European Union and its 
Member States sought to employ to this end. Accordingly, an examination of the EU blocking 
statute and a description of the „Special Purpose Vehicle“ were undertaken.  
Will the JCPOA survive? As has become plain in the light of the literature review undertaken, 
an assessment of the nuclear deal with Iran can hardly be strictly legal. For so much is 
political about it, this thesis recalls the basic objective of the deal, which is to prevent Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. So the groundbreaking virtue of the JCPOA is the 
underlying idea of the nuclear deal: Iran would abandon its ambitions to develop nuclear 
weapons and would submit to far-reaching and strict control of compliance with this 
commitment in exchange for substantial sanction-relief. As Iran has for a long time complied 
with its commitments, which the IAEA has consistently certified, the deal has until recently 
been effective. However, with a view to recent events there are good gounds to believe that 
the future of the nuclear deal with Iran may realistically be considered as seriously imperilled.  
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